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The Rise of the Kuomintang

A Survey of Government in China since 1911

THE capture of Peking by the Chinese Nationalist armies on June 3 marked the climax of a military campaign begun two years ago, when General Chiang Kai-shek set out from Canton with the object of uniting China under the banner of the Kuomintang. The historical significance of the military victory of the Nationalist allies depends entirely on the ability of the Nationalists to achieve the political unification of China, which has defied the efforts of Chinese leaders, both North and South, since the birth of the Republic in 1911. Other military victories have promised political order and stability during the past seventeen years, but none has been able to consolidate vast semi-independent territories of the ancient Empire into a single homogeneous unit.

Will the leaders of the new Nationalist movement be able to realize the ends for which they have fought? Will Feng Yuxiang, "the Christian General" who joined the Nationalist drive only after it had united Southern China, remain loyal to his adopted party? Will the Nationalist leaders at Nanking be able to restrain their military chiefs who are left in control of conquered terri-

tories? Is the administrative machinery of the Kuomintang adequate to cope with the pressing problems—domestic and foreign—which confront the new government? While these questions can only be answered by time, some insight into the nature and accomplishments of the Nationalist movement may be gained from a review of the Kuomintang in relation to China's history since 1911.

The following report surveys the early history of the Kuomintang, its struggle to establish a republican government—first in Nanking then in Peking—finally its complete break from Peking and the creation of a new Nationalist government in the south which today controls nearly all of China.

Under the ancient régime the Emperor ruled as the Son of Heaven. He appointed viceroys and governors for the different provinces of the Empire, but neither he nor his representatives directly controlled the people. He was rather a symbol of unity. The three groups upon which the government actually rested were the magistrates in the district counties, the elders of the

village and the heads of family groups. As long as these local authorities functioned without impinging unduly on popular self-government, the masses gave little heed to what happened higher up in the councils of the central government. The Chinese people have probably been the least governed great nation known in history.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

A history of the Kuomintang movement reveals that it is the result of a slow growth which had its beginning in a number of secret societies organized during the late nineteenth century for the purpose of overcoming the "alien" Manchu régime. The principal leader of this movement was Sun Yat-sen, who as a young man organized a society in Hongkong known as the Hsing Chung Hui (Raising China Society), which was the parent of the later T'ung Meng Hui (Get Together Society), and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

The efforts of this first early organization were unsuccessful, and in 1895 Dr. Sun was forced to flee successively to Hongkong, Japan, Honolulu and America. He spent short periods in each place, organizing the Chinese emigrants and stirring up enthusiasm for a Manchu-less China. In 1896 he went to England, where he was kidnapped by agents of the Imperial Government. After several days incarceration in the Chinese Legation, his release was demanded and secured by the British Government, and he continued his travels as a revolutionary propagandist, visiting Europe, America and the Far East.

Between 1904 and 1907 a group of young Chinese found their way to Japan and there organized a new society, the T'ung Meng Hui, whose methods were definitely revolutionary and were aimed at driving out the dynasty by any means. The influence of the T'ung Meng Hui spread rapidly among the intellectuals of China, especially in the student classes, and was also strongly supported, particularly financially, from abroad by Chinese emigrants in the United States, the East Indies and the Malay Peninsula.

China's rulers, both Manchu and Chinese, saw clearly in the years following upon the Boxer outbreak of 1900 that China's political


organization was inadequate and that reforms and reorganization must be undertaken. Numerous proposals were projected. In 1906 the Manchu rulers agreed to proceed toward constitutional monarchy along the lines which the Japanese Government had followed. But when the Imperial officials attempted to assert and strengthen the authority of the central government, particularly in extending the railway system, the people of the provinces refused to be coerced, and the weakened fabric of the Imperial organization broke under the strain.

REVOLUTION OF 1911 ENDS MANCHU RÉGIME

The Revolution of 1911, brought about by the "boring from within" of secret political societies, took place in a series of local revolts. As soon as the Imperial officials in the provinces were ousted, the provinces became virtually autonomous, *i. e.*, they were governed by the leaders who had taken the initiative in organizing the revolutionary societies or were in command of the revolting armed forces. The leaders of all the revolutionary provinces were invited by the Shanghai junta, the group then dominant, to meet at Nanking. There the delegates drew up a provisional constitution and elected Sun Yat-sen Provisional President. The T'ung Meng Hui soon after became the Kuomintang.

In November, 1911, the Throne promulgated a cabinet form of government naming Yuan Shih-kai as Premier. A National Assembly was also created. In the north the leaders were attempting to create a constitutional monarchy, under which the Manchus would preserve a nominal rulership. Yuan Shih-kai offered amnesty and high positions in the new government to the southern revolutionists if they would resume allegiance under this constitutional régime, but they countered with an offer to make Yuan provisional president if he would bring the north to the republican form they had instituted in the south. On February 12, 1912, the Manchu rulers abdicated and a mandate was promulgated establishing a "republican government" under Yuan Shih-kai.

Thus in 1912 there were two governments



Prepared by the Foreign Policy Association

MAP OF NATIONALIST CHINA

each claiming to represent the Republic. A compromise was eventually reached by which the Nanking National Assembly was induced to accept Yuan Shih-kai as Provisional President, and he in turn agreed to accept the Provisional Constitution drawn up at Nanking. The capital was moved to Peking.

The compromise was effected with reservations on both sides, however, and relations between Yuan Shih-kai and the Kuomintang were frequently strained. While Yuan strove to establish himself as either the permanent President or Emperor of a new Dynasty, the Kuomintang sought to establish a republic modeled after the

United States. Although the quarrels between Yuan and the Kuomintang were kept beneath the surface for some time, summary executions of Southern leaders, supposedly at the instigation of Peking, inflamed feeling in the South against the "despotism and tyranny" of the Peking Government, and minor uprisings were frequent.

The Nanking National Council, which was transferred to Peking in April, 1913, to serve as the Legislature until the inauguration of a new bi-cameral assembly, was overwhelmingly Kuomintang and hostile to President Yuan Shih-kai. This hostility was augmented by the President's arbitrary conclusion, in the face of parliamentary opposi-

tion, of the Reorganization Loan for £25,000,000 with the Four Power Group.

In July, 1913, a revolt broke out in Kiangsi and spread through several provinces which declared their independence of Peking. During the course of the fighting Dr. Sun was forced to flee to Japan. This "Second Revolution" lasted only two months, and was easily suppressed by Yuan Shih-kai. Its failure destroyed the pro-Kuomintang units of the army and practically eliminated the Party, for the time being, from national political affairs, leaving Yuan Shih-kai with a free hand.

YUAN MAKES HIMSELF PRESIDENT AND DICTATOR

During this period the legislators in Peking were chiefly engaged in drafting a permanent constitution, one of the provisions of which was aimed at Yuan Shih-kai's known desire to be dictator. Like Cromwell, Yuan had no patience with the "puerile chattering" of the legislators. Through bribery of the parliamentarians, he solved his immediate difficulties by having himself elected full President, instead of Provisional President. After taking the oath of office for five years, he promptly issued a mandate unseating all the Kuomintang members of Parliament, who were forced to leave Peking. In January, 1914, a new advisory body, grandiloquently called a Council of State, was created, composed of nominees of the President. With the assistance of this group Yuan governed as an autocrat until his death in June, 1916.

After the suppression of the Second Revolution the government at Peking became involved in a number of foreign and domestic difficulties which the Kuomintang leaders were able to exploit in an effective propaganda campaign among the intellectuals. The most important were the question of China's participation in the World War, Japan's Twenty-One Demands and Yuan's attempt to make himself Emperor.

SOUTHERN PROVINCES REVOLT AND FORM A CONFEDERACY

The Kuomintang maintained a steady fire against Yuan which culminated in a third revolution, in December, 1915, when Yuan was to have mounted the throne. By the

middle of April, 1916, five of the southern provinces had declared their independence and a Southern Confederacy was organized with a supreme military council at Canton. Within a month Szechwan also declared its independence.

Meanwhile, Peking was practically without funds as taxes were being withheld by the provincial rulers. Yuan revoked his monarchical scheme in April and in June, 1916 he died. Li Yuan-hung, as Vice-President, succeeded to the Presidency on a parliamentary program, and the Kuomintang, through its majority in Parliament, was given another opportunity to share in the Peking Government. In the new Parliament of 1916, however, President Li found it necessary to straddle between two major parties,—the Kuomintang and the Chinpu-tang (Step Ahead Party), which represented a coalition of several minor groups made up for the most part of intellectuals. This latter party stood for a national centralized government under strong executive authority, in contrast to the Kuomintang which at that time favored a federation program giving large powers to the provinces.

CONFLICT BETWEEN KUOMINTANG AND NORTHERN MILITARY PARTY

During this period the Kuomintang came into sharp conflict with the Peiyang Military Party, frequently referred to as the "Anfu" clique. This party, or clique, of militarists was divided into two factions—the Chihli faction under Feng Kuo-chang and the Anhwei faction under Tuan Chijui. The latter became Premier under President Li in 1916 and Feng, Vice-President.

The Kuomintang parliamentarians, led by Sun Yat-sen, opposed the Military Party on the question of China's participation in the World War, believing that such participation would give the militarists undue authority. It was rumored in Peking that the militarists were proposing to negotiate a series of War Participation Loans, and suspicion was aroused as to the use to which this money would be put. On May 7, the President proposed that China become a belligerent. Parliament replied by asking questions about secret negotiations and loans from Japan. On May 10, 1917, the parliamentarians found themselves

locked out of the House when they attempted to meet and were badly handled by soldiery in plain clothes, apparently acting under the instructions of their officers, who belonged to the military clique. Parliament thereupon refused to consider the resolution to declare war until the Cabinet was reorganized, *i. e.*, until Premier Tuan was eliminated. In due course most of the Cabinet members resigned, leaving the Premier isolated. He was finally dismissed by the President on May 23, and Dr. Wu Ting-fang was appointed Premier.

TUAN AND THE ANFU CLIQUE REGAIN CONTROL OF PEKING

During the negotiations over China's participation in the war, Tuan Chi-jui convened a conference of military governors in Peking. A War Participation Bureau was established, which rapidly became a super-governmental organization controlling finances, resources and soldiers, independent of any normal governmental control.

This militarist group was determined to crush the Republican Government in Peking. During the negotiations over China's participation in the war they set up a "military government" at Tientsin and proceeded to move against Peking. Parliament, adopting a conciliatory attitude, offered concessions, but on June 10, President Li, fearing Peking would be sacked, ordered its dissolution. Dr. Wu Ting-fang refused to sign the dissolution mandate and resigned.

General Chang Hsun, an ardent monarchist, who, during the disturbances, had come up from the south to "mediate," attempted in July to restore the Emperor to the throne, but the *coup* was blocked by Tuan who controlled the troops around Peking. President Li, who had fled to Tientsin during the overthrow of the government, had re-installed Tuan as Premier. One of his first acts was to declare war against Germany. Li refused to return to the Presidential office after the "traitors" were punished and, accordingly, Feng Kuo-chang, the Vice-President, succeeded to the Presidency. Tuan Chi-jui, as premier-dictator, ruled the government for several months without any parliament.

THE PERIOD OF THE CANTON DIRECTORATE

The next year witnessed a complete break between the Kuomintang and the Peking Government. The Northern militarists had set up a new Parliament composed of their own tools, known as the "Tuchun's" Parliament, which assembled in August, 1918, and elected Hsu Shih-ch'ang, a close friend of Yuan Shih-kai, as President.¹ The office of Vice-President remained vacant from lack of agreement among the militarists.

The Southern leaders refused to recognize the Peking Government, denouncing the "Tuchun's" Parliament and all its acts as illegal. A conference of seven independent provinces was therefore convened at Canton on January 1, 1918, and a Directorate of seven members was created to form the "Southern Constitutionalist Government." Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi and Wu Ting-fang (father of Dr. C. C. Wu, who recently arrived in the United States) took the leading rôles.

CANTON DEMANDS EXPLANATION OF ANFU-JAPANESE LOANS

Almost immediately a war broke out between the Southern Constitutionalist Government and the Peking Government which drifted on fruitlessly for about a year. A Peace Conference was convened in Shanghai on February 20, 1919, but the powers of the delegate from Peking were so limited that the first meeting of the conference was postponed until April, and eventually it failed when the Southern delegate, Tang Shao-yi, demanded a complete list of the unsecured Japanese loans made by the militarists' War Participation Bureau and full explanation of the activities of "Little" Hsu, who had risen from clerkship to a position as Tuan's chief lieutenant. Tang suspected that the Northern militarists were mortgaging the future of China for funds which they used for private internal politics. The Peking Government refused to permit publication.

The Conference resumed in August, with the appointment of a new northern delegate, but again failed when the Peking Government declined to publish the agreements demanded. The aggregate amount of Japanese

1. "Tuchun" is a romanization of the Chinese term for military governor. Sometimes also referred to as "tupan."

loans at this period was over Y200,000,000 (\$100,000,000).

In 1919, the Southern Government took the first step to gain recognition from the Powers by demanding a pro-rata share of the customs surplus. This immediately raised the whole question of the effectiveness of regional independence. Early in 1918 representations had been made by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, through the Canton Commissioner of Customs, to secure a proportionate share of the customs for the Southern Government, on the ground that the money was needed to maintain law and order. In July, 1919, agreement having been reached by the Diplomatic Corps and the Peking Government, a share of the surplus was released and credited to the Canton Government.

UNION OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND THE KUOMINTANG

Until 1920 the membership of the Kuomintang had been composed largely of old type Chinese intellectuals. Hostility to the "Tuchun's" Parliament in Peking, which negotiated the Japanese Loans, and to Peking's acceptance of the Shantung Award at the Treaty of Versailles gave rise to the Student Movement of 1919. Sun Yat-sen was able to use this movement to attract many new members to the party. When the movement reached its peak in Shanghai during the period of the anti-Japanese boycott, Dr. Sun and the students joined forces. Soon afterwards the character of the Kuomintang underwent a radical change. It expanded in numbers, organizers were sent into the schools, the writings of Dr. Sun were published in immense quantities and circulated among the students, and translations of European and American works on politics and economics were procured and printed in Japanese, which many students could read, and distributed through the schools. Through these channels much Communist literature also entered China. The messages of Dr. Sun were passed on by the students to the laborers and peasants. The Kuomintang which emerged from this contact with the Student Movement of 1919 was uncompromisingly nationalistic, everywhere anti-militarist and anti-feudalist, but not then anti-foreign.

Soon after the establishment of the Southern Constitutional Government in Canton in 1918, quarrels developed among the provincial leaders of the South and Sun Yat-sen and his associates were driven from power by the Kwangsi military faction. They took refuge in Shanghai, until the Kwangtung faction succeeded in regaining control of the province in 1921, when Dr. Sun was enabled to return to Canton to make that city the base for further nationalist activities. The important revenues of Kwangtung, of which Canton is the provincial capital, were largely at his disposal and from that time on the movement gained steadily in strength and influence.

SUN YAT-SEN ELECTED "PRESIDENT" AT CANTON

The former "Constitutional Government" set up in 1918 was reestablished in April, 1921, and Sun Yat-sen was elected "President of the Chinese Republic." A number of members of the old Parliament at Peking joined him in Canton, where a municipal government was organized with Dr. Sun's son, Sun Fo, as the Mayor. For a time it seemed probable that the new government would succeed, but the Minister of War, who was also Civil Governor of Kwangtung, objected to Dr. Sun's anti-feudal ideas and revolted. Previously the Kuomintang had supported the movement for provincial autonomy, but after the period of union with the students Dr. Sun began to look upon it as objectionable—partly because it prolonged feudalism in China and also because he felt that it might aid the "imperialist Powers" to bring about a partition of China.

After considerable fighting, Canton fell to the Civil Governor of Kwangtung, and again Dr. Sun was forced to flee. This marks the end of one period in Kuomintang history, for when the Party again returned to Canton in 1924, it had begun its alliance with the Communists.

While Sun Yat-sen was struggling to establish a "constitutional" government in the South the government of North China remained in the hands of the "Anfu" clique of Northern militarists led by Tuan Chi-jui. This group was able to continue in office largely through a series of Japanese loans,

known as the Nishihara Loans, the extent of which the Kuomintang delegate had sought to disclose during the abortive peace conference mentioned above. In 1921 the War Participation Bureau, under cover of which Anfu-Japanese financing was carried on, became the "Frontier Defense Bureau," for the purpose of "protecting China from Bolshevism." Those who too heartily opposed Anfu policies were quietly assassinated by "Little Hsu," close supporter of President Hsu Shih-ch'ang.

The opposition of Chang Tso-lin, who reigned supreme in the Three Eastern Provinces, to the activities of "Little Hsu" in Mongolia, which Chang considered to be his own sphere of control, proved, however, less simple to subdue. Another faction offended by the manipulations of the Anfu party was the "Chihli" military group, controlled by Tsao K'un and Wu Pei-fu.

TSAO K'UN AND WU PEI-FU OVERTHROW THE ANFU PARTY

Taking advantage of public hostility to the Anfu régime and the popular feeling aroused by student demonstrations over the Anfu-Japanese dealings, General Wu early in 1922 executed a sudden "retreat" from Hunan into Chihli, stopping en route to evolve a compact with Tsao K'un who was to share in the overthrow. At the same time Chang Tso-lin advanced upon Peking from behind his Manchurian walls, "explaining" that he wished to assure the safety of his former patron, President Hsu Shih-ch'ang. The three generals converged upon Peking and the Anfu troops, under the military dictatorship of Tuan Chi-jui, were unable to resist their superior numbers.

The power of the Anfu leaders at once collapsed, and control of the administration shifted from Tuan Chi-jui to Chang Tso-lin and Tsao K'un. Wu Pei-fu was treated as a subordinate and given no chance to share in the government. The "Tuchun's" Parliament was dissolved and a new election ordered. Little progress was made, however, as the power of the Peking Government barely extended outside the city's walls. The real authority rested with the "Chihli" tuchuns, who formed a cabinet according to their own liking and dictated their wishes to the Government, particularly

in the matter of financial subsidies upon which it depended.

When the Washington Conference was called, the delegates appointed by President Hsu were ordered to compromise with Japan on the Shantung railroad issue. In return it had been agreed Japan was to support Chang's plan to annex Shantung province.² Wu Pei-fu revealed this plot and with the collaboration of eight tuchuns of central China in the spring of 1922 proclaimed war against Chang Tso-lin. Wu's armies were finally successful and Chang Tso-lin was driven back to Manchuria.

President Hsu Shih-ch'ang was compelled to resign and after some delay Li Yuan-hung was prevailed upon to resume the Presidency. The Parliament which had been dissolved under military pressure in 1917 was reassembled in Peking in August, 1922. It was, however, little more competent than its predecessors; for many months the Senate was unable to choose a Speaker and successive sessions broke up in wild disorder owing to the bitter jealousies existing between the various political groups. The Cabinet presided over by Dr. Wang Chung-hui as Acting Premier survived longest, but it was driven out in December as a result of charges made against the Minister of Finance.

TSAO K'UN BUYS THE PRESIDENCY

During 1923 the "Chihli" Party greatly strengthened its position in the government. From May until October of that year supporters of the senior militarist, Tsao K'un, conducted a thorough-going campaign aimed at the removal of Li Yuan-hung from the presidency in favor of Tsao. Immense sums totalling over \$15,000,000 (Mex.)³ were spent in bribing members of Parliament, and intrigues were set afoot among the militarists. The climax came with demonstrations by the Peking Police and the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called "Christian General." President Li fled to Tientsin in June and Tsao K'un was "elected" to the Presidency in October. Constant quarreling went on in the legislature throughout the

2. See Gowen & Hall, *An Outline History of China*, p. 403, 408, 479.

3. The Chinese dollar, popularly known as a "Mexican" dollar, is worth about \$.50, gold.

summer. At the same time a new civil war of larger proportions was brewing.

In the north Chang Tso-lin tried to recapture Peking from Wu Pei-fu whose forces blocked his way on the Chihli-Manchurian border in the neighborhood of Shanhaikuan, where the Great Wall meets the sea. The "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, a subordinate of Wu's, was entrusted with the defense of Peking and the passes leading into Chihli from the Jehol region, to the northwest of the capital.

THE "CHRISTIAN GENERAL" TAKES OVER PEKING

While heavy but indecisive fighting was taking place between Chang and Wu on the Shanhaikuan front, Feng Yu-hsiang suddenly reappeared in Peking on October 22, 1924, and declared for peace. The Chihli forces under Wu entirely collapsed and he barely escaped by sea to Shanghai, taking only a remnant of his army with him.

Feng temporarily assumed control of the Central Government, keeping President Tsao K'un under surveillance in his palace and ejecting the young Manchu Emperor and Empress from the "Forbidden City" in Peking where they and their retainers had been allowed to reside since the abdication. The forces of the "Christian General," together with those which had turned against Wu or had surrendered, were formed into several armies known as the Kuominchun, or National People's Army. Thus Chang and Feng found themselves in control of North China.

Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, former chief of the Anfu clique, was returned to power as Provisional Chief Executive in November, 1924, and remained nominal head of the government until April, 1926. It was his task to maintain a balance between Feng and Chang whose alliance was the fruit of circumstances rather than of mutual liking. It was inevitable that at the slightest provocation these two ambitious militarists should fall apart. Hostilities broke out toward the end of 1925, and early in December of the same year General Kuo Sung-lin, one of Chang Tso-lin's most able and trusted lieutenants, who was apparently in secret

correspondence with Feng, revolted and advanced on Mukden, but Japanese troops, sent to guard the South Manchuria railway zone, prevented his victory. Kuo was captured and shot.

FENG SURRENDERS PEKING TO CHANG TSO-LIN

Heavy fighting continued during the spring between the Kuominchun and the Manchurian troops in the neighborhood of Tientsin, until the Kuominchun finally evacuated in March, 1926. The next month Peking was evacuated, the "Christian General" having announced his intention to retire from military and political life. Very soon after, Feng left for Moscow. His withdrawal was not apparently due so much to defeat as to a need for reorganization in order to hold a position fast becoming precarious. For the time being he had failed in his tug of war with Chang. After the Kuominchun evacuation of Peking, Marshal Tuan fled to Tientsin and the former President, Tsao K'un, was released from custody, but he promptly tendered his resignation, leaving Peking for several weeks without a semblance of government, except a Committee of Public Safety.

During the next few months of Chinese contention, control of Peking passed to Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Pei-fu, who had so recently been warring with the Manchurian satrap. But they, too, were as ill assorted a pair as were Feng and Chang, and the maintenance of personal power in each case was marked by tension.

A Regency Cabinet represented the government of Peking, maintaining the fiction of constitutional continuity, and keeping the two so-called allies at bay. Chang, it was generally reported, had an ardent desire to be President.

On December 2, the formation of the Northern Military Alliance, or Ankuochun, (Tranquillity Restoration Army) with Chang as Commander-in-Chief, was announced. This new alliance included Generals Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang and Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi, as Vice-Commanders, and was created ostensibly to combat the strength of the Nationalist Army which in the south had begun an invasion

of the Yangtze Valley under General Chiang Kai-shek, with Peking as their objective. Wu, who was then in the region of Hankow, seems to have had no particular rank, but he was associated with Chang in his anti-Nationalist moves in 1926 and 1927.

A new Regency Cabinet was appointed on January 12, 1927, which functioned with interruptions until on June 17 Chang Tso-lin took the long awaited step of proclaiming himself Dictator of the Chinese Republic. He assumed the office with great ceremony and the next day the Regency Cabinet resigned. Chang had out-manoeuvred Wu in obtaining complete control in the North.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

After the Student Movement of 1919 a number of Chinese students went to Russia to investigate the Soviet system of government. Many of these students became Communists and when they later returned took an active part in organizing a Communist Party in China. The Communist movement in Asia was organized at the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient (September, 1920). This Congress resulted in two definite actions of which the most important was the organization of a Council for Propaganda and Action in the Countries of the Orient.

The Third International utilized to the fullest extent the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in its efforts to secure a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*—at the expense of Japan—and to organize the discontent and resentment fermenting among Chinese students and laborers into a nationalist-revolutionary movement.⁴ The party was first organized as a secret society and in the beginning, its members were recruited largely from the student class. In the north it conducted an intensive campaign among students; in the south, in Canton, Shanghai and Hongkong, among the laborers. Because of the extreme secrecy of its methods and the fact that it was constantly shielded by the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the Soviet Consulates in the ports, little was known of its activities until Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang in January, 1924.

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE KUOMINTANG

The first historical relationship between Communist Russia and the Kuomintang, however, may perhaps be dated from January, 1923, when Mr. A. A. Joffe, the Soviet Ambassador to China, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen issued a joint statement which revealed the very cordial relations already existing between them.

A few months later, Ambassador Joffe was replaced by Ambassador Karakhan, who substituted an aggressive Communist propaganda for Ambassador Joffe's policy of a bourgeois front. An article appearing in the *Izvestia* on September 2, 1923, written by an official in the Soviet Government, stated that Ambassador Karakhan's mission to China was for the purpose of creating an alliance "to prevent Japan from absorbing Manchuria and to enable China to fight foreign imperialism."

In an address delivered to the students of the National University in Peking on June 7, 1924, following the signing of the Sino-Russian agreement in Peking, Ambassador Karakhan said:

"Now, how ought the struggle to be carried on? You, who are but one part of the Chinese people, cannot do it by yourselves, though I know that every one of you is ready to die, if necessary, for the happiness of your people. Your task is to make the great majority of the Chinese people understand your own conception of your people's welfare.

"You must, each of you, open the people's eyes to the Imperialistic treaties that stifle them and in this respect you have an excellent weapon in your hands in the shape of the Agreement just concluded; you must explain and compare it with those that are a bond upon the Chinese people. You must explain that the Agreement signed with the Soviet Union is an example of such treaties as China must strive to complete with all countries.

"We have driven Imperialism out of our country, but we shall not be satisfied until there is not a single oppressed nation in the world. When you are strong enough to start the battle against Imperialism, which is oppressing your country, you may be assured of the sympathies of the people of the Union.

"Long live the brotherhood of the peoples of China and the Union! Long live China, independent and free from Imperialism!"

4. Pasvolksy, L., *Russia in the Far East*, p. 86 ff.

This address marks a definite departure from the earlier "middle ground" policy of Russia. It was delivered after the signature of the Sino-Russian Agreement and after a satisfactory agreement had been concluded with the Kuomintang.

SUN YAT-SEN REORGANIZES PARTY ALONG SOVIET LINES

Sun Yat-sen, however, was not necessarily anti-foreign. His activities prior to 1924 show that in his attempt to organize a government he was greatly influenced by the form of government in Great Britain and the United States. In 1923, he sought World War veterans in the United States and Canada who would help him to reorganize his army on a modern basis. Mr. Eugene Chen, then his secretary, was sent to Hongkong and London in an endeavor to secure British assistance, and appeals were also made to Germany. It was not until these missions had failed that Dr. Sun turned to Ambassador Karakhan for assistance, asking him to send a representative with whom he might discuss mutual relations. Michael Borodin was sent. He saw at once that the basic problem was one of organization and promised to secure arms and munitions from Soviet Russia on easy terms, together with a corps of military and civilian experts to aid in reorganizing the party and the government along Soviet lines. In 1924, Borodin was appointed High Adviser to the Kuomintang. He proposed unity of principle, unity of party organization and a strict party discipline. Dr. Sun endorsed these proposals and commenced a series of lectures on the "Three People's Principles," which after his death became the "creed" of the Nationalist movement. These three principles may be translated as Socialism, Democracy and Nationalism. The Party was reconstructed after the manner of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia and all members were required to re-register on the party rolls, in order to avoid illicit use of the Party name.

A Central Executive Committee was organized and no person or group could speak for the Party except through this mouthpiece. "The Party was re-organized into

locals, which elected members to an annual Party Congress. This Congress elected a Central Executive Committee, which, in turn, selected a Political Bureau to perform the executive functions of the Government. The system was very complicated and was aimed at preventing any one man from becoming greater than the Party itself."⁵

COMMUNISTS ADMITTED TO THE KUOMINTANG IN 1924

The program outlined above was endorsed at the Party Congress of January, 1924. This Congress was perhaps the most significant in the history of the Kuomintang, marking as it did the beginning of the forward movement which carried the armies last year to the Yangtze and beyond, and this year to Peking. This Congress also admitted the Communists to the Nationalist Party, on condition that in entering they adopted the principles of the Kuomintang. Thus while accepting the Communists the Kuomintang did not accept Communist principles, merely adopting the Communist form of organization.

In a statement issued at the time of his resignation, Chiang Kai-shek made the following reference to Dr. Sun's views when the Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang:

"For several years I have been credited with the advocacy of the policy of befriending Russia and admitting the Communists. When I came back from Russia after a tour of inspection, I had very clear cut views as to the essential differences between the two policies. . . . I was unable to convert the learned doctor to my view, but I was anxious to know his. He said, 'China has no room for the co-existence of Communism with Kuomintang. We have to admit the Communists and convert them, and the San Min Principles will serve as a good melting pot.' This is more than enough to show that in admitting the Communists into the Kuomintang fold Dr. Sun never intended to do so at the expense of injuring his party. . . ."⁶

Nevertheless, the Communists rapidly gained power within the Kuomintang Party, and aroused the opposition of the non-Communist elements. Public demonstrations were held against them in Canton and the continued friction finally resulted in a split

5. *China Year Book*, 1928, "The Kuomintang," by G. E. Sokolsky, p. 1321.

6. *Ibid*, p. 1382.

within the Kuomintang, during which Sun Fo, Mayor of Canton, resigned and left the city. By October, 1924, however, the Communist faction had gained the upper hand in the city and held fairly free sway.

In November, 1924, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, Provisional Chief Executive in Peking under the Chang-Feng régime, invited Dr. Sun to attend a Reorganization Conference in Peking for the ostensible purpose of establishing the unification of China. Dr. Sun, having apparently reached an understanding for cooperation between the Anfu group and the Kuomintang, started for Peking, although in doing so, he probably realized that Marshal Tuan had Presidential aspirations which if fulfilled would mean subordination of the Kuomintang to the Anfu group. He arrived in Tientsin on December 3 but was taken ill and was unable to proceed to Peking until December 31.

THE DEATH OF SUN YAT-SEN

Many members of the Kuomintang were opposed to the plan for re-unification with the north and when reports of Dr. Sun's illness reached Canton several groups within the Party began the struggle for the succession. These may be divided into two principal factions, the "Elder Statesmen" and the "Prince Faction." The former tended toward radicalism, advocating the closest cooperation with the Russians and the Communists, while the latter were more moderate followers of Sun Fo.

While Dr. Sun was ill, the Kuomintang leaders in Peking organized a club to prepare for the new leadership which they foresaw would be necessary. This group later became known as the "Western Hills Conference" Group. In policy it was anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Two years later, after Nanking's split with the radical Hankow Government, this group joined with Nanking.

On March 12, 1925, Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in Peking, leaving behind him a "will," a message to the people of China, which has become virtually a religious testament among the followers of the Kuomintang. After his death he became an even greater

and more powerful leader than he was in life.

While Dr. Sun lived there was no question of leadership, but immediately after his death quarrels developed over the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee and the chairmanship of the Political Bureau. The menace of war with a Yunnanese General furnished the radicals in Canton with an excuse for demanding even greater control of the government. The Central Executive Committee, practically dominated by the Communists, was given increased authority, and greater dependence was placed upon the army, which was being trained by Russian military advisers brought to Canton by Borodin. Toward the end of April actual fighting broke out, and the Central Executive Committee expelled from the Party 124 conservative members.

PRO-SOVIET RESOLUTION OF MAY, 1925

On May 23, 1925, the Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution stating that the Kuomintang would not cooperate further with the government then in Peking, and that the only government with which it could cooperate was Soviet Russia. In consequence the Party would in the future devote its efforts to securing the cooperation of Soviet Russia for the emancipation of the Chinese people and the reform of the Chinese Republic.^{6a}

COMMUNISTS INCREASE THEIR POWER IN THE KUOMINTANG

The repercussion which followed the May 30th Affair in Shanghai and the Shameen Incident of June 23 strengthened the hold of the radicals on the Kuomintang and other public organizations in China. After the Shameen affair approximately 100,000 workers left Hongkong and settled in Canton. They were fed and supported by the Government, and were organized as strike pickets by Chinese, who were later discovered to be Communists. Through this organized group the Communists were soon able to gain actual control of the Kuomintang and the Government of Canton. A new commission of sixteen members was appointed in July,

^{6a.} See *China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1325.

1925, to head the Government, with Wang Ching-wei as head of a triumvirate which included Liao Chung-kai as Minister of Finance and Hu Han-min in charge of foreign policy. The "Western Hills Conference" group, representing the conservatives, protested against this Communist usurpation of power and issued a statement denouncing the "Bolshevization" of the Central Executive Committee, whose acts they declared were against the "Sanmin" (Three People's) Principles of the late Dr. Sun. The Communists became so powerful, however, that late in July nine of the most influential of the conservatives were forced to leave Canton.

The alliance between the Kuomintang and Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian General," was also strengthened during this period. Feng, with the assistance of his Russian advisers, began the establishment of a Kuomintang régime in Shensi, Kansu and Mongolia and he continues today to be associated in all political and military enterprises with the Kuomintang.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S EARLY POSITION IN THE PARTY

In August, 1925, General Chiang Kai-shek, then principal of the Whampoa Military Academy—the training school for army officers and a headquarters for the dissemination of Kuomintang propaganda—appeared on the scene. Comparatively little is known of his activities up to this time. Although an early member of the Kuomintang, he had attracted but little attention to himself and held no important post in the Party councils. For a time he seems to have been engaged in banking business in Shanghai; later to have gone to Japan to study military science and then to Soviet Russia to study in a military academy attached to the Red Army. Upon his return to China he became Chief-of-Staff to General Chen Chiung-ming and while holding this position advised Dr. Sun to attack General Chen, whose loyalty seemed often doubtful. After this incident he disappeared for a time and then returned to Canton as Principal of the Whampoa Academy, which was attracting many young Chinese who were eager to serve China as officers in the revo-

lutionary army. For generations, in China fighting had been regarded as a degrading occupation.

While Dr. Sun lived Chiang Kai-shek was not a significant figure. In military affairs he was subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies. He remained quietly at work training his cadets for the coming struggle, but although he was Principal, the Whampoa Academy was actually under the control of the Russian advisers, and Borodin's approval was necessary in all questions of policy. Thus the Communists had the support of the Whampoa Cadets—the nucleus of a new army—and the 100,000 strike pickets to enforce their will in Canton.

BORODIN BECOMES DICTATOR OF THE KUOMINTANG

From the fall of 1925, until his departure in July, 1927, Borodin was the outstanding figure in the Kuomintang. Though he had been associated with Sun for only a brief time, he had gained the leader's confidence in an extraordinary manner and his influence remained after Dr. Sun's death. He assumed dictatorial powers, and appointed Communists, both Russian and Chinese, to pivotal positions. A Political Department attached to each army served as a check on possible Kuomintang opposition or defection. "Every action of a commander was hereafter to be subject to scrutiny by the head of the Political Department attached to his army. A Russian military adviser was placed in charge of staff work. The Political Departments and the Russian advisers reported directly to Borodin, who could countermand decisions reached by the Commanders. . . . A terror was inaugurated to suppress opposition in any form."⁷

After the assassination in August, 1925 of Liao Chung-kai, the Finance Minister, T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Dr. Sun and a prominent financier, was appointed Minister of Finance in the Canton Government. Prior to his appointment he had taken no active part in politics, but after becoming Minister of Finance he definitely threw in his lot with Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek. He and his family, which included Mme.

⁷ *China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1331.

Sun Yat-sen, his sister, soon became Borodin's strongest supporters in the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang greatly benefited under Soong's efficient administration, which placed its financing on a much sounder basis.

PROMOTION OF THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT

During the period prior to Dr. Sun's death in Peking, the question of the relation of the Kuomintang to Christian schools arose. For some time the Communists had protested that the curriculum of the mission schools was inimical to the development of free and enlightened citizens, and an investigation of these schools was ordered. Towards the end of 1925, with the approach of Christmas, the Communists began preparations for an extensive anti-Christian demonstration throughout China.

Previously, there had been demonstrations all over China, but they had lacked the support of such an organization as the Kuomintang to make their protests effective. The so-called "propaganda" disseminated by the World's Student Christian Federation, which held its Eleventh Conference in Peking in 1922, had contributed to the movement. The visit to China of Professor John Dewey of Columbia and Bertrand Russell, the English philosopher and mathematician, in the opinion of many educators, had made in China a profound impression upon the youth of the country and helped largely to turn the mind of the Chinese intellectuals toward science. This was eloquently revealed in the tepid reception accorded to the Indian philosopher, Rabindranath Tagore, in 1924.

The question of the danger to China of Japanese schools in Manchuria and of American and English mission institutions was heatedly discussed. It was argued that Chinese were educated to regard foreign institutions as better than Chinese. In some mission schools it was discovered that no Chinese was being taught at all, and that the students had not even a rudimentary knowledge of the literature and history of their own country.

The anti-Christian movement received its major support from Canton where the population was being continually stirred up to oppose everything foreign. Sun Yat-sen was a Christian, and while he lived a certain amount of restraint was exercised, but after his death this was removed and his successors demanded that no religion be taught in the schools as part of the regular curriculum. In Peking the Ministry of Education promulgated a ruling that private schools in China must register with the Ministry, and must conform to the Ministry's educational system, and further, that religion must be made an optional subject.

As the Nationalist armies progressed northward during 1926 and the first half of 1927, their soldiers occupied schools, hospitals and churches, sometimes destroying them, and frequently driving missionaries away. The Political Department attached to each army was everywhere anti-Christian.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK ATTEMPTS ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP

From January 1 to 20, 1926, the Kuomintang Party Congress was in session in Canton for the purpose of electing a Central Executive Committee. A resolution was passed during the session urging an alliance with Soviet Russia for the purpose of undermining imperialism. During this period differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin developed into an open split and in March, while Borodin was absent from the city, Chiang attempted an anti-Communist *coup* in Canton. He was supported in this movement by numerous opponents of the Russian régime, among them Dr. C. C. Wu. Wang Ching-wei, the Communist head of the Canton Government, was forced to leave the city and seek refuge abroad. A large number of the Communist-directed strike pickets, were disarmed, as well as the Marine Corps, and the 4th Regiment of the 1st Army, also believed to be Communist. A number of Russian advisers were arrested and deported on Russian ships.

Borodin, however, was not to be so easily eliminated and the need of unity, apart

from Borodin's own personality, was illustrated by his check on the "Northern Expedition" to stop the advance of Wu Pei-fu into Hunan. Chiang, who had become Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, was forced to settle his differences with Borodin before he could proceed against Wu. As a result those who had supported Chiang in his anti-Communist *coup* were driven from office.

The arrangement between Chiang and Borodin has never been made public, but it has been reported that when Borodin returned to Canton he denounced Chiang and his colleagues for betrayal, demanded that the alliance with Soviet Russia be continued and that the Chinese Communists be reinstated. In response to these demands Chiang Kai-shek asked what assistance Borodin would give him in the "Northern Expedition." Borodin would promise nothing except on the above terms, to which Chiang finally assented, receiving immediately 20,000 rifles, ample munitions, field pieces and aeroplanes, and the promise of further supplies from Vladivostok as soon as they could be obtained. It was also agreed that a large number of Russian military advisers were to participate in the war. Chiang accepted Borodin's assistance and began his drive north against Wu Pei-fu who was holding Hankow.

THE NORTHERN YANGTZE CAMPAIGN IN 1926

The Kuomintang military campaign, which began in July, 1926 and continued through the remainder of the year, achieved remarkable success. By August, Chiang Kai-shek, as Commander-in-Chief, had reached northern Hunan where he joined forces with General Tang Sheng-chi. The Northern troops under Marshal Wu Pei-fu offered little resistance and by September had begun the evacuation of Hankow. A few days later the Nationalists occupied Hanyang and Hankow, twin cities on the Yangtze, their success being aided by the treachery of the General in command who surrendered almost without fighting. Wuchang, on the south side of the Yangtze, held out for some time, finally surrendering on October 10 after a month's siege.

A Political Bureau was immediately set up, following the capture of Hankow, and was later moved to Wuchang. Labor strikes, organized and protected by the Bureau, practically closed industry in this region. Picketing was instituted and large labor demonstrations were frequent in Hankow, the chief industrial center. The Wanhhsien incident of 1924, arising from the clash of interests between native boatmen and foreign steamers on the Yangtze, was revived to stir up sentiment among the masses against Great Britain. Labor pickets from Canton were sent overland to carry on anti-foreign, and especially anti-British, propaganda. On October 6, labor demonstrators attempted to enter the British Concession, but the mob was kept out by landing parties.

Clashes between Chinese and foreigners in the Yangtze valley were reported with increasing frequency. Nationalist soldiers and stray brigands fired upon a number of foreign gunboats and the fire was returned. Mission property was occupied and foreigners from the upper Yangtze basin began a general exodus.

1926 CONGRESS WIDENS SPLIT BETWEEN CHIANG AND BORODIN

On October 15, 1926, an Extraordinary Kuomintang Congress met at Canton. In addition to the Central Executive Committee, representatives of provincial Kuomintang committees and overseas branches were present. The Congress concerned itself primarily with the determination of Party policy and Nationalist Government policy in relation to the district and provincial governments taken over by the Nationalists in their military campaign; the strengthening of party unity; and the organization of unions of merchants, workers, peasants, teachers, students, members of the liberal profession, and soldiers, as the foundation of a national revolutionary movement. A significant resolution was passed requesting Dr. Wang Ching-wei, as Chairman of the Political Council of the Party and the Nationalist Government, to resume his duties, in order to unite more closely the revolutionary forces, both civil and military. This was in reality a politi-

cal attack upon Chiang Kai-shek, aimed at reducing his authority in the Party and the Government, and further widened the "split" between Chiang, in the field, and Borodin, who dominated the Congress.

LOWER YANGTZE CAMPAIGN IN 1926

While one wing of the Nationalist army was pressing steadily across Hunan and Hupeh, Chiang Kai-shek, in command of another section, advanced through Kiangsi into territory under the control of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang. Foreign observers in Shanghai followed developments with anxiety, uncertain whether Sun would join forces with his recent enemy, Chang Tsung-chang, whom he had dislodged from Kiangsu and Anhwei the previous year, or join with the Nationalists. Fear that Chang Tsung-chang might again recover Shanghai apparently prompted Sun to challenge the advancing Nationalists. Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, was captured on September 22 and heavy fighting continued in the province throughout October. Treason within Marshal Sun's army and continual labor agitation in the Shanghai area finally dissipated his strength. A Kuomintang Committee, seated in the French Concession at Shanghai, received orders from Hankow by wireless and directed Kuomintang and Communist efforts in the rear, while Marshal Sun was in the field attempting to stave off the Nationalist Army's advance through Anhwei and Chekiang. Manoeuvred into this critical position, Marshal Sun was forced to appeal to Chang Tsung-chang for aid. Late in November, when Chiang Kai-shek was directing an offensive against Hangchow, Marshal Sun left hurriedly for Tientsin and personally sought the support of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, offering to "forego all his rights except the control of Chekiang and Kiangsu, if his requests were granted." It was as a result of these negotiations that the Northern (Ankuochun) Alliance came into being.

During November and December the unrest and agitation centering in Hankow spread more rapidly along the Yangtze Valley basin, and conflicts with foreigners

became more frequent. Early in December the seat of the Nationalist Government was moved from Canton to Wu-Han (the three cities of Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang).

SUMMARY OF THE MOVEMENT AT THE END OF 1926

At the close of the year 1926 the Kuomintang was in a state of political flux. The members of the "Old Kuomintang," the successors of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had been with him during his early struggles, had for the most part been replaced by new and younger men. The "Old Kuomintang" leaders were headed by such men as Tang Shao-yi, Dr. C. C. Wu, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei, and many others less well-known abroad. One section of the younger group gathered about Chiang Kai-shek. It was not completely in sympathy with the ruling element in the Kuomintang and its policies, not completely willing to subordinate its military power to civilian authority. This faction, with alliances extending among the provincial tuchuns, many of whom clung to their vestiges of feudal power, was often accused of being entirely militaristic and mercenary in purpose. The second faction was dominated by Borodin, and was at the time master of the situation. It was composed of young Nationalists such as T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, Eugene Chen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teng Yen-ta of the Political Bureau, Chen Kung-po, who was responsible for stirring up much of the Hankow labor element, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen, wife of the former leader, and Sun Fo, his son.

This latter group drew its greatest power from the propaganda, or agitative arm of the Kuomintang. By far the greatest number of Nationalist military victories had been achieved through the activities carried on by advance guards under the supervision of the Political Department. Through a process of infiltration agitators stirred up Kuomintang sympathies among students, workers and soldiers. Enemy territory was honeycombed and the heart of its resistance destroyed before the Nationalist armies appeared on

the scene. It was "cheaper to buy and destroy than to fight," and "more efficacious to disintegrate than to destroy." These methods of propaganda, while Russian in inception, and doubtless fomented by Russian Communists in the beginning, soon took root among the masses, with the result that those who organized the campaign were frequently unable to curb or control the forces they had unleashed.

Since 1923, Nationalist propaganda had been stressed at two points: (1) internally, upon militarist feudalism; (2) internationally, upon the "unequal" treaties between China and the Powers. Neither patriotism nor religion, those great rallying standards of history could offer much appeal to people whose patriotism was overlaid by familism and whose religion was more individualistic than nationalistic. Anti-foreignism was used to short-circuit the progress of patriotism. Although the masses did not fully comprehend the objectives of the leaders, and were often duped and misled, it was a fact that the Kuomintang as a political force was able to weld thousands of Chinese into an organization more effective than its soldiers; a force easily mobilized and not very ready to compromise.

The excesses of the agitators in Hankow forced the closing of twenty-seven banks, antagonized the merchant and banking groups, and threatened a general tie-up of the city's business. The Kuomintang frequently found itself hampered by the mistakes of its own agitators, the weapon many times being turned against itself. But even its more moderate leaders felt that it could not afford to abandon this means of warfare, for to do so would have meant a continuation of the old feudal-tuchun system. The situation in Hankow, a rich, revenue-bearing city, and always a prize, was cited in support of this method. If the Kuomintang had not developed these revolutionary methods, one of the allied tuchuns would doubtless have seized the city and declared his independence of the Kuomintang while the army was busy in another province. But with Hankow seething with strikes, student uprisings, foreign complications and labor troubles, no tuchun dared to take the city

The large bodies of new troops taken under Nationalist command had to be whipped into shape, permeated with the principles of "Sunyatsenism" and ground through the revolutionary machine which had created Whampoa Academy.

Borodin's reorganization of the Party, his introduction of the committee system and of modern western revolutionary tactics cannot well be ignored in any summary of the movement. But the "Revolutionary Tutor," despite his undoubted capacity and brilliance, was not a Chinese. He could not even speak the language. As a foreigner, holding a position then second only to the memory of Dr. Sun, he had already antagonized many of the genuine Nationalists in the Party who preferred to see things done poorly by Chinese than perfectly by a foreigner. Opposition to foreign domination was to prove, during the coming year, too deep rooted to tolerate Russian domination any more than Japanese or British. The Russian advisers were undoubtedly useful and their presence added weight, but their importance during this period has perhaps been exaggerated. They were weapons and like all weapons, discarded when no longer useful.

INCREASE OF RADICAL ACTIVITIES EARLY IN 1927

The opening of the year 1927 found the Nationalists in virtual control of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and rapidly extending their sway over the coastal provinces of Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsu where they threatened Sun Chuan-fang's control of Shanghai.

A general strike and boycott of everything foreign culminated in Hankow, during the first week in January, in intense anti-British demonstrations. Following reports that British soldiers had killed a number of Chinese on the previous day, the mob rushed the British Concession on January 4. The British soldiers held the Concession without using either rifles or bayonets until responsible Chinese authorities appeared who promised the Concession authorities that if their marines were withdrawn the Chinese would maintain order. The troops were withdrawn and the mob again rushed the

Concession. Considerable property damage was done and a few foreigners were injured.

The occupation of the British Concession at Hankow was regarded by the Communists as a complete triumph. The concentration of effort in Hankow to achieve a dictatorship of the proletariat by strikes, boycotts and disorders, the stirring up of the masses to an intense anti-foreignism, and the transfer of authority from the Kuomintang, as such, into the hands of the Communists made such a conflict between the Nationalist Government and foreigners inevitable.

Other mob attacks on foreigners, less serious than that at Hankow, also broke out at Foochow, Amoy, Kiukiang and other points on the Yangtze during this period.

HANKOW RIOTS BREAK PARTY UNITY

The Hankow Incident further aggravated the differences between the moderate and radical elements in the Party. Many of the more moderate members left Hankow and joined the group gathering about Chiang Kai-shek which opposed Hankow's Communist program.

A Nationalist conference held at Nanchang about the middle of the month attempted to heal the break in the Party and a weak compromise was effected by which Chiang agreed to cease his efforts to stop the radical activities of the Borodin group until the campaign against the north was completed. Hankow was unable, however, to prevent Chiang from continuing his drive toward Shanghai—the success of which would obviously militate against their own power.

Agreements relative to Hankow and Kiukiang were concluded on February 19 and March 2, 1927, between the Nationalist Government and the British Government, which were diplomatic victories for the Hankow faction, and therefore for the Communists. On the other hand the dispatch of British, American, Japanese, French, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, and other forces to Shanghai, which began early in January, and the concentration of a large number of naval vessels in the Yangtze was beyond the calculations of the Hankow leaders, who

were anticipating that the Shanghai International Settlement would fall into their hands as the British Concessions had done at Hankow and Kiukiang. Instead, the Shanghai Municipal Council announced after the Hankow disturbances that it would maintain law and order within the International Settlement area and the French Concession at all costs.

SHANGHAI FALLS TO THE NATIONALISTS, MARCH, 1927

After the return of General Chiang Kai-shek from the Nanchang Conference, the drive toward Shanghai was resumed. The Nationalist advance on Shanghai was preceded by a general strike which involved approximately 100,000 laborers. Labor demonstrations, directed by the Communist Party, continued intermittently but with increasing ferocity until the Chinese city was turned over to the Nationalists. The Committee directing the strikers had its headquarters in the French Concession and took orders direct from Hankow. This agitative factor, coupled with the defection of the General left by Marshal Sun to defend the southern front and police Shanghai, made the Nationalists' capture of the city a comparatively easy matter.

Before the Southern armies entered, several encounters took place between Nationalist agitators and the remnants of the retreating Northerners. These were followed by a reign of terror under Communist direction, lasting for several days but carried on largely in the suburbs adjacent to the International Settlement.

The city was officially taken over by the Nationalists on March 22. During the *dé-bacle* bodies of Shantung and Chihli troops, belonging to the retreating forces, endeavored to force their way into the International Settlement but were fired upon and stopped. Those who surrendered their arms, however, were allowed to enter. Otherwise there were no serious disturbances between Chinese and foreign forces.

Soochow, Changchow, Chinkiang and other cities fell in rapid succession. Feeling between moderates and radicals was exceedingly tense and the race for Nanking be-

tween Chiang Kai-shek and Cheng Chien, the latter acting for the Hankow radicals, was speeded up.

FINAL SPLIT BETWEEN CHIANG AND BORODIN

During March relations between Chiang and Borodin reached a breaking point. Each disputed the authority of the other to represent the Nationalist Government. Borodin insisted that the seat of government be maintained at Hankow, where he had a proletariat well organized under the Communist Party; Chiang was determined to create a new center free from Communist control. Chiang ordered a meeting of the Central Executive Committee at Nanchang on March 1, to which the Russian advisers were not invited, while Borodin convened his own meeting at Hankow.

During the sessions at Hankow resolutions were adopted reducing the power of Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief and subordinating him to a Military Council. At the same time the powers of General Tang Sheng-chi, who was in direct command of the Hankow armies, were increased. To counteract the rising power of the Communists, Chiang retaliated by entering upon a series of military alliances which made him a more powerful military factor than before.

NANKING AFFAIR A PLOT TO DISCREDIT CHIANG

On March 23, Nanking was evacuated by the Northern troops and the next day the Sixth Nationalist Army under General Cheng Chien, of Hankow, entered the city. These troops were sent to Nanking as "guest" troops; ostensibly to "aid" Chiang Kai-shek in the capture of the city. But they entered before Chiang's main force arrived, and systematically looted the city, occupying foreign firms, residences and mission institutions, and driving out all remaining foreigners.

During the course of the attack six foreigners were killed, and five wounded. Looting and assault upon foreigners continued throughout March 24 and it was not until then, when a party of foreigners

gathered at "Socony Hill" signalled to the foreign warships for assistance, that action was taken by the foreign Powers. A barrage of shrapnel was dropped around the hill and the molestation of foreigners ceased.

Investigations since the Nanking incident justify the conclusion that it was primarily a Communist effort to discredit General Chiang Kai-shek and leave him without position or power. The attack on the foreigners was incidental to this general program. It was later revealed that a similar attack, intended to completely destroy Chiang's power, was planned by Hankow on Shanghai on the following Sunday, March 27.

MODERATE GROUP SETS UP NEW GOVERNMENT AT NANKING

General Chiang Kai-shek's record in the Kuomintang, due to his abortive anti-Communist *coup* in 1926, was not without blemish, and it was uncertain whether he would be able to rally enough support to overcome the difficult predicament into which he was plunged by the Nanking affair. None of the material elements for coping with the situation was in his favor. He had only a handful of troops in Shanghai, while the city was dominated by the Communists. Corraling all his forces Chiang got the labor unions in Shanghai to suspend their strikes and demonstrations, and succeeded in organizing a series of conferences, attended by men who had been irreconcilable opponents for years, but who united in opposition to Hankow's Communist policies. A group was finally brought together which agreed to abandon the Hankow Government entirely and call a Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee at Nanking on April 15 for the purpose of "purifying" the Party. A policy of moderation was outlined, and a \$30,000,000 loan was arranged through the Shanghai Chinese Bankers Association, and Mr. K. P. Chen, Manager of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, eventually headed the Financial Commission of the Nanking Government.

All available troops were sent to Nanking, which had been chosen as the seat of the new government, and most of Cheng Chien's army was promptly disarmed. Plans were

drawn up to eliminate the Communists and concerted attacks were carried out in Shanghai, Soochow, Foochow, Changchow, Nanking and other centers.

POWERS PROTEST THE NANKING OUTRAGES

On April 11, identic notes were presented by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to Eugene Chen at Hankow and to Chiang Kai-shek at Shanghai in protest against the Nanking Incident. These notes demanded:

1. Adequate punishment of the commander of the troops responsible.
2. Apology in writing by the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, including a promise to refrain from violence or agitation against foreign lives and property.
3. Complete reparation for personal injuries and material damage done.

The notes concluded:

"Unless the Nationalist authorities demonstrate to the satisfaction of the interested Governments their intention to comply promptly with these terms, the said Governments will find themselves compelled to take such measures as they consider appropriate."

To these protests of the Powers, Eugene Chen replied separately on April 14. In content they were much the same, promising to make good any damage done by Nationalists, to make reasonable reparation for personal injuries, to protect foreigners in the future, and proposing that the question of punishment and apologies of the commanders responsible be submitted to either the government inquiry then in progress or to an international commission of inquiry.

The replies of Chen were generally considered unsatisfactory by the foreign Powers, but the next move was made more complicated because of the pronounced split between Nanking and Hankow and uncertainty as to which government could or would assume responsibility. The Nanking affair having precipitated the long-impending split within the Nationalist ranks, the real offenders, the Communists, were already being punished by the new Nanking Government more drastically than the foreign Powers would have demanded.

Among foreigners, the Nanking incident alienated much sympathy for the Nationalist

cause. The significance of the event as a test of power within the Kuomintang, rather than as a premeditated attack upon foreigners, was generally overlooked. Only a handful of foreigners remained in territory under Nationalist control after the Nanking affair, and these were largely nationals of the countries which had renounced their special treaty privileges.

PROBLEMS BEFORE THE NEW NANKING GOVERNMENT

The establishment of a national government—the problem facing the moderate group which had rallied to the support of General Chiang Kai-shek—presented fresh difficulties. Chiang's armies controlled only southern Kiangsu, Chekiang, part of Anhwei and the politically valueless province of Fukien. Kwangsi and Kwangtung were broadly autonomous, and Kiangsi, while nominally under Hankow, was actually more or less of a buffer state until the end of the Hankow régime. Opposite Nanking, on the north bank of the Yangtze, Chang Tsungchang maintained a Shantung-Chihli army—a constant threat to Chiang's capital. To the east, the forces of Sun Chuan-fang were attempting to recover Shanghai. Thirty thousand foreign troops and sailors held the Shanghai foreign areas, and up the river were Nationalist armies still loyal to Hankow.

Faced with this situation, Nanking devoted all its energy to the retention of territory already gained and to the elimination of Communists. Foreign affairs did not loom as large as at Hankow, where the governing policy was based upon a participation in the Anglo-Russian struggle in Asia. It was necessary, nevertheless, to have a Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dr. C. C. Wu was chosen because of his experience and ability.

The administrative machinery of the new government was confused and disorganized for a long period. There was little time to work out plans, and select the most competent men, for it was imperative to concentrate against attacks in the field. Money was desperately needed and financing was turned over to bankers who had had no experience as tax officers, and trade was

greatly handicapped. Loans, voluntary and forced, likewise aroused much criticism among the business groups, particularly in Shanghai.

With the expulsion of the Communists, the personnel was restored to a "pure" Kuomintang basis. The test was complete acceptance of Dr. Sun's Three Principles, and denunciation of Communism, Imperialism and "Tuchunism." New bourgeois elements were brought into the Party which added materially to its strength, and the peasant and labor unions were disarmed and reorganized upon a more moderate basis. At the same time the violence of the "moderates" against Communist activities weakened the support of many of Chiang's earlier sympathizers.

SOVIET EMBASSY RAID REVEALS COMMUNISTS' POWER

On April 6, under the direction of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and with the written permission of the senior minister of the diplomatic corps, a raid was carried out by the Peking police on the Soviet Embassy area. The raid was intended to cover only certain non-embassy buildings on the grounds, the embassy buildings proper being immune according to international law, but before it was over the military attaché's office had been entered and many incriminating documents seized. Some thirty-five Communists were arrested, of whom about twenty were put to death after a pretense of a trial.

The disclosures following the raid gave the widest publicity to the relations between Kuomintang Communist leaders and the Soviet Embassy, revealing the complete control which Borodin had exercised over the Kuomintang. This publicity strengthened the position of the Nanking Government with the Kuomintang rank and file, and the power of Hankow steadily declined from that time onward. To Chiang Kai-shek's "Manifesto to the People," issued in April, 1927, Hankow replied by expelling him and a number of other important leaders from the Kuomintang, but the Nanking faction, after the Soviet Raid, organized a "Party Purification Movement" for the extirpation of Communists and made anti-Communism a popular rally with party members. By

May, 1927, the Communists were completely without influence except in Kiangsi, Hupeh and Hunan.

The Soviet Embassy raid at Peking, together with the raid on May 12 on Arcos House, the Russian trade delegation's headquarters in London, with its further disclosures of Soviet Russia's activities in China and evidence of Russia's purpose to undermine British power in the Far East, helped to promote a better feeling among the foreign powers towards the more moderate program of the Nanking Government. Blame for the Nanking incident was laid upon the Communists, and it was decided, due as much as anything to the American attitude, to postpone for a time the application of sanctions for the Nanking outrages. On May 17, Great Britain recalled its representative from Hankow and formally ended its relations with that government.

MODERATES AND RADICALS COMBINE AGAINST PEKING

After the split between Hankow and Nanking, parleys were opened between Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin, and it seemed at one time as though Chiang might ally with his former enemies against Hankow. But the parleys proving unsuccessful, Chiang Kai-shek opened negotiations with Feng Yu-hsiang, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Hankow faction in April in place of Chiang. Feng appeared, however, to be in sympathy with Chiang Kai-shek and therefore unlikely to aid Hankow in overthrowing Nanking. During May, Hankow found itself uncomfortably surrounded by a number of generals of uncertain allegiance.

In May as the Northern armies began a drive southward across the Yellow River into Honan, major hostilities between Nanking and Hankow temporarily ceased. General Tang Sheng-chi advanced northward from Hankow and Feng emerged from Shensi. Together they moved toward northern Honan to meet the advancing Ankuochun armies. Yen Hsi-shan, the "Model Governor" of Shansi, also joined the Nationalists early in June, although in theory he had until then been allied with the Ankuochun. On the east and west fronts the moderate Nationalists were at the same time

proceeding northward through Anhwei and successfully penetrating Shantung Province. The long line of defense necessitated by the east and west fronts and the danger of a rear attack from Yen Hsi-shan left the Northerners in a very critical position. Defection of one of the associated generals in Honan finally forced them to make a rapid retreat back into Chihli during June.

JAPANESE TROOPS IN SHANTUNG AROUSE HOSTILITY

As the Nationalists advanced into Shantung they came into conflict with Japan. The "friendship policy" of Baron Shidehara, consistently followed during his administration, had greatly strengthened Japan's position with the Nationalists. In April, however, Baron Tanaka, head of the Seiyukai Party and several times Minister of War was appointed Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This fact, coupled with the advance of the Nationalists into the sphere of Japanese interests, aroused much speculation as to whether a more drastic policy would be adopted. An answer was given in May, when Japan dispatched a contingent of 2,000 troops to protect her interests in the province. The Japanese Government declared, however, that the troops were dispatched as an unavoidable measure of self-defense and that they would be kept in Shantung no longer than was necessary. Protests were promptly entered by the Chinese Governments, North and South, which apparently feared that Japan intended to re-establish the position she had held in Shantung prior to the Washington Conference. The other foreign Powers moved their forces from Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley to the Tientsin and Peking areas and ordered their nationals to withdraw from the danger points in the interior.

With the dispatch of 2,000 more Japanese troops to Shantung late in June, further protests were entered by the North and South, and a boycott of Japanese goods was begun in Shanghai and Canton. But the moderate Nationalist forces made steady advances through the province, the armies under Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang offering comparatively little resistance. In the western area severe fighting was reported and large numbers of wounded

poured into Hankow, further complicating a situation already difficult because of internal dissension.

THE "CHRISTIAN GENERAL" DENOUNCES HANKOW RÉGIME

As the Northern armies were forced back, Feng Yu-hsiang advanced east from Shensi and his armies, distributed along the Lung Hai railway, which connects China's two main arteries—the Peking-Hankow line and the Tientsin-Pukow-Shanghai line—were soon able to join with those of Chiang Kai-shek. Representatives of the radical Hankow faction met with Feng early in June at his headquarters in Chengchow, the western railway junction, but were apparently unable to secure his continued support. A few days later Feng went into conference with Chiang Kai-shek at Hsuechow-fu, the latter's headquarters. It later developed that Nanking agreed to furnish Feng with ammunition and a certain amount of money if he would join in (1) denouncing and suppressing the "Reds" and (2) in an attack on Peking. In return Feng was reported to have received quantities of ammunition and something like \$5,000,000 (Mex.) from Nanking. Shortly after the conference Feng issued a statement against the Hankow radicals, which demanded the dismissal of Michael Borodin, and the submission of Communists to Kuomintang principles.

Meanwhile, Chang Tso-lin in Peking had assumed the title of "Generalissimo of the Forces for the Suppression of Communism"—partly for its effect on the foreign Powers and partly to add to his own aggrandizement. A new Cabinet was announced soon after, and a statement of policy issued, in which Chang declared it was his purpose to drive Communists and Communism from China, that the unequal treaties must be revised by negotiation and that meanwhile foreign lives and property would be protected.

SOVIET COMMUNIST PLOT REVEALED AT HANKOW

The difficulties at Hankow, which had originated over Michael Borodin, were soon to lead to the complete collapse of the Wuhan Government, and the departure of the

Russian leader. Borodin's decline in popularity has been ascribed to various causes, but the version most often agreed upon runs to the effect that his fall was the result of an accidental exposure of a program of the Third International which Borodin had been secretly executing. During June, an Indian Communist in casual conversation with Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei revealed this new program, which showed that Borodin was to organize a 100 per cent Communist Government in Hankow, that all Kuomintang leaders were to be eliminated and that a Communist army was to be created to wipe out the Hankow Government's forces.

BORODIN AND THE COMMUNISTS ARE EXPELLED FROM HANKOW

When Borodin was faced with this program, and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his failure to inform his associates, the Hankow Government took definite steps to outlaw Communism and to deport Borodin to Russia. Borodin left Hankow on July 27.

Although Borodin was discharged, many of the Russian military advisers remained, and the activities of the Communists did not immediately cease. The political allegiance of the former leaders in the Hankow Government, however, was difficult to determine. When Borodin left Hankow, all the foreign Communists went with him. Mme. Sun Yatsen, who disapproved of the anti-Communist activities of the Hankow Government, on the ground that it permitted the military members to have an ascendancy over the civil officials, also went to Moscow after a short time in Shanghai. Mr. Eugene Chen likewise departed. George Hsu-chien, for a long time Borodin's chief aide in Hankow, joined forces for a short time with Feng Yu-hsiang, and then disappeared; and Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei, who had previously split with Nanking over the question of Borodin's power, declared themselves anti-Communist.

Personal antagonisms between Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min of Nanking and Wang Ching-wei, the Hankow radical, and other leaders of the two factions made a union of the Nanking and Hankow elements practically impossible. Finally the "Christian General" suggested

a reconciliation conference at Nanking, but while these proposals were under consideration Chiang Kai-shek resigned as Commander-in-Chief and as a member of the Nanking Political and Military Councils. He retired from public life on August 12, 1927, departing soon after to Japan.

CONFUSION FOLLOWS CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S RESIGNATION

Chiang Kai-shek's farewell Message contained three requests: (1) that the Hankow and Nanking factions clear up misunderstandings and act together; (2) that the northern campaign be continued; (3) that the Party continue to expel Communists. With both Chiang and Borodin out of power the question was asked: Will the strength of the Kuomintang be dissipated or will their elimination make for harmony in the ranks? Both tendencies appeared to be operating. The former was evidenced by the increasing influence of the militarists at Nanking and Hankow, and the latter by hopeful reports following a conference at Kiukiang of representatives from Hankow and Nanking, where it seemed that terms acceptable to both factions had been agreed upon.

Considerable pessimism as to the future of the Kuomintang and the moderate program of the Nanking faction was evident both in China and abroad during the summer of 1927. The Nanking Government was in serious financial straits which were not remedied by the imposition of new and heavier taxes. An attempt to float a loan of \$30,000,000 (Mex.), secured on the salt revenues, and to raise the customs duties on imports and exports far above the rates agreed upon at the Washington Conference, brought vigorous protests from the Powers. While many of these increased duties had to be reduced later or entirely withdrawn, they contributed greatly to the confusion of the summer months.

These factors, together with the recalcitrance of the labor unions, which forbade members to work except at wages which the foreign firms considered prohibitive, combined to tie up almost all industry along the Yangtze Valley. Although foreigners were able to return to the interior they found business quite stagnant.

Japan suffered particularly during this period because of the campaigns and boycotts directed against it following upon the announcement of Japan's "positive policy" at the conclusion of the Far Eastern Conference in Tokyo on July 7. This phrase was interpreted as implying at least the possibility of armed action, and the dispatch of the additional troops inland to Tsinan, Shantung, and the Nationalist losses which occurred at that time lent color to such criticisms. The Premier's statement also drew attention to the special position of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia, and specified that this region must be kept free from disturbances.⁸

BREAKDOWN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY IN THE PARTY

The period from August 12, when Chiang Kai-shek resigned, until his return on November 10 was exceedingly chaotic. Lack of any organized leadership caused a general breakdown of political authority at both Nanking and Hankow. Militarists gained the upper hand at each point and quarrelled among themselves for supremacy. Little progress was made except by the armies under Yen Hsi-shan, the Governor of Shansi, and Feng Yu-hsiang in the drive toward Peking, and even they did not accomplish much. The armies paying nominal allegiance to Nanking and Hankow were too well occupied with their own difficulties to offer much support, and only managed to hold their own against the Northern armies under Marshal Sun, who tried to regain Anhwei and Kiangsu during August.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE KUOMINTANG

The dissension in the Kuomintang was more than a split between Communists and anti-Communists. Actually the divisions may be diagrammatically stated from conservative to radical as follows: "Western Hills Conference" Group, the Nanking Faction, the Wu-han (Hankow) faction, the semi-Communists and the Communists.

The Communists had already been expelled from the Party and become a separate political entity actively hostile to the Kuomintang.

The semi-Communists were an even greater menace because it was so nearly impossible to tell who they were. Posing as genuine Nationalists they worked not in the interest of the Kuomintang but in the interest of Communism. Borodin had preferred to use semi-Communists rather than Communists because they would obey him when Communists would not.

The Wu-han (Hankow) group represented the historical succession of the Party. In spite of tacit opposition to the rising power of the Communists, many members of the Wu-han Government remained loyal because they believed and insisted upon Party discipline. They were particularly bitter against Chiang Kai-shek, therefore, because he represented to them a militarist with Napoleonic aspirations, whose success would wreck the Nationalist movement and result in a return to "Tuchunism."

The Nanking faction on the other hand established the Nanking Government on the assumption that it was so important to break with the Communists that no consideration should stand in the way. They were more bitter against the semi-Communists than Hankow was against Chiang Kai-shek, and though many of them disliked Chiang because at Borodin's demand he had previously ousted them from Canton, they joined with him in order to destroy Communist power. Union between Nanking and Hankow was impossible, therefore, so long as Chiang remained in Nanking. His resignation increased the possibilities of union, although the impediments in the way were still more personal than political.

Then there were the "Western Hills" men, whose history in the Party went back before 1911. After the reorganization of the Party in 1924 most of them had failed to register because they were unwilling to be associated with Communists. During the heyday of the Kuomintang's success they consistently declined to be identified with the political activities of the party or its current leaders. Yet there could be no unity in the Party without them.

8. See F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 16, "Recent Japanese Policy in China."

**OBSTACLES TO PARTY
REUNIFICATION**

Informal conferences of the Kuomintang were begun in September in Shanghai, arrangements having been made for a meeting of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Control Committee as they existed before the split, but excluding all Communists and as far as possible all semi-Communists. The principal impediments to the success of these conferences were General Tang Sheng-chi, the Soong group, the semi-Communists and danger of a Communist attack.

General Tang was an old time Chihli party militarist with feudal ideas, who had been utilized by Borodin at Hankow to break the power of Chiang Kai-shek. After the split he had turned on the Communists because they were encouraging the peasants of Hunan to sequester the land of his own landowning class, but he was not therefore willing to subordinate himself to anti-Communist Nanking. Instead he steadily increased his own power in the Hankow region.

Objections to the Soong group were based largely on their close affiliation with Borodin while he was in power. Their following was largely among the returned student class and certain groups of Chinese and foreign business men who regarded T. V. Soong as a singularly able administrator.

The hostility and suspicion directed against semi-Communists and the very vagueness of this wide definition, which served often as a cloak for personal animosity, threatened to split the Party wide open, instead of resulting merely in a party purification movement.

The Communists worked to disrupt Kuomintang unity. Borodin's entire program had been based upon the formula of division, and the Communist Party followed the same tactics after his departure.

Unity was also dependent to an unfortunate degree upon the willingness of the civilian leaders to subordinate personal vanity and ambitions to the general cause.

Only slight progress toward re-unification was made during September and October through the Shanghai conferences, and apparent progress was frequently destroyed

by repudiation when the delegates of the different groups returned to their leaders, who in turn were forced to compromise with the militarists.

**HANKOW AND CANTON
FACTIONS OPPOSE NANKING**

On October 18, the armies directly attached to Hankow and Nanking came into conflict at Wuhu. The Military Council at Nanking ordered two generals who had shown perhaps the least willingness to recognize Nanking's authority to proceed against Hankow, and thereby cleared the way for Chiang Kai-shek's return to Nanking which appeared to be imminent.

These generals met with very little resistance as they advanced up the Yangtze and eventually the control of Hankow passed into their hands and General Tang was forced down into Hunan.

Meanwhile, attempts were being made by Wang Ching-wei who had resigned from the Hankow Government, supposedly to further unity with Nanking, to combine the Communists at Hankow with the Communists at Canton and there set up a new government.

From one point of view, there appeared by the opening of November to be a complete collapse of all civilian control of the Kuomintang, but the breakdown also cleared the way for a new start on a different basis. On November 10, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek returned to China from Japan.

**RETURN OF CHIANG INAUGURATES
PERIOD OF COMPROMISE**

There was much talk during November of re-uniting the Nanking, Hankow and Canton factions of the Kuomintang, but there were many obstacles in the path. An informal conference was called at Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek and invitations were extended to Li Chi-shen, Chiang Kai-shek's supporter in Canton, and Wang Ching-wei, his old enemy, who was trying to set up a radical government there. After they had left Canton a *coup d'état* was carried out by Chang Fa-kuei, who succeeded in gaining complete control of the city. Invitations were also extended to Hankow, but the generals there evinced little desire to join with Nanking.

The informal conference convened on

November 24, and at once revealed sharp divisions among the leaders. Chiang Kai-shek attempted to mediate between three major groups—the Kwangsi group, headed by Li Chih-shen, the Canton group under Wang Ching-wei, and the “Western Hills Conference” group which took little part in the factional quarrels. Wang Ching-wei was outspoken in his condemnation of Nanking’s Standing Committee. He was strongly opposed by Li Chih-shen, who with many other members demanded a punitive expedition against Chang Fa-kuei at Canton, and denounced Wang Ching-wei as Chang Fa-kuei’s accomplice. Discussion centering principally over this point continued well into December.

COMMUNIST COUP AT CANTON, DECEMBER, 1927

Meanwhile, the Communists at Canton were strengthening their position in the south, and also carrying on radical activities among the labor groups in Shanghai and Hankow which greatly hampered business. On December 11, the Communists at Canton seized control of the city and set up an administrative commission under one of the most radical leaders. Three days later the city was recaptured by Li Fu-lin, who was allied with Nanking, and there was inaugurated a reign of terror against the “reds” which was marked by gross barbarities of all sorts. For a number of days wholesale executions were carried on against persons of whom there was the slightest suspicion of Communism. The Russian Consul-General was arrested and very badly treated and the Vice-Consul and several other Russians were shot without any attempt to hold a fair trial.

Official announcement of the termination of Nationalist recognition of Soviet Russia was made on December 15 by Dr. C. C. Wu, the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs. Russians not engaged in political activities were allowed to remain in Nationalist territory, but all others were promptly deported. After the Communist *coup* at Canton and the sharp reaction which followed, Wang Ching-wei left China, and Chiang Kai-shek, his rivals eliminated, became the outstanding figure in the Kuomintang.

Following Wang Ching-wei’s departure it was decided during the course of the Shanghai Conference to hold a formal session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Nanking early in 1928. While Feng offered at this point to subordinate himself in all political and administrative questions to Nanking, the leaders at Hankow revealed no such willingness.

In December the expedition against the North was renewed in real earnest. Nanking troops pushed up the Tientsin-Pukow railway against Marshal Sun Chuan-fang. On December 16, they reached Hsuehchow and re-established rail communications with Feng Yu-hsiang. During the same period another drive was going on in the south to destroy the influence of Chang Fa-kuei, and Canton was retaken by Li Chih-shen on December 29. These military successes had their effect in keeping the Nationalists together.

This background of the internal dissension in the Kuomintang during 1927 is necessary to show the difficulty that has been and is being experienced in welding this organization into a harmonious whole.

SUMMARY OF THE YEAR 1927

At the close of the year 1927 there appeared to be more hope for unification of the Kuomintang than had existed for some time. Chiang had been restored to favor and it was generally believed that he would resume command of the Nationalist armies immediately after being formally appointed to that post by the Central Executive Committee, which was expected to meet early in January.

The most prominent single factor in the political and military events of the year was the ejection of Soviet-Russian influence from Chinese affairs. During the winter and early spring, it reached the zenith of its power, but by the end of the year it had almost completely passed out of the picture. The disastrous economic consequences of the attempts to set up administrations controlled by workers and laborers had contributed largely to the revulsion against Communism which in turn resulted in a struggle between those who believed in civilian Party discipline and those who

placed the military successes of the Kuomintang uppermost.

Foreign hostility, which reached its peak after the Nanking Incident, began to subside after the split between Nanking and Hankow and the obvious disintegration of the radicals' power. At the end of the year there was a widespread feeling that while trade conditions would continue to be bad for some time, there was no need for nervousness, and foreign troops were gradually withdrawn in the Yangtze region.

Business conditions were bad all over China, due to interrupted communications and irregular tax levies by local military authorities. Bad crop conditions and excessive oppression by General Chang Tsung-chang had created great suffering in Shantung, and peasants by hundreds of thousands were emigrating to Manchuria. Close to a million settlers were reported to have made the journey in 1927. Reports from all over the country indicated that the common people (with the possible exception of Shansi and Kueichow alone) were undergoing much suffering at the hands of soldiers, bandits and peasant militia.

RESULTS OF THE 4TH PLENARY SESSION, FEBRUARY, 1928

Lack of a quorum delayed the meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, originally scheduled for January 4, 1928, until February 1 in Nanking. Dissensions in the Party were again simmering, but were cloaked in compromise. The moderates seemed to be deepening their influence, however, for there was a much more practical tone in the Manifesto of February 9, the work of the Fourth Plenary Session, than was evident in the pronouncements issued during the days of the Chen-Borodin régime. The three Principles of Sun Yat-sen were set forth as the Party's doctrine. In principle the Party was declared to be anti-Communist and to advocate the welfare of no single class. A bid was made for the support of the conservative merchant class in the resolutions limiting the power of the peasant and labor unions.

Chiang Kai-shek was formally re-appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies, Chairman of the Central

Executive Committee and of the Military Council. The ruling adopted at Hankow nearly a year previous, providing that the Commander-in-Chief could not also be chairman of the Military Affairs Committee or any other standing committee, was specifically abolished. Its cancellation indicated the strong position Chiang commanded at Nanking. In foreign relations the Manifesto declared that an independent and peaceful China was essential to the peace and progress of the world, and expressed the hope that the foreign Powers would co-operate with the Nanking Government in the revision of unequal treaties. All previous arrangements for alliance or cooperation with the Soviet authorities and the Communist Party were cancelled.

NATIONALISTS RESUME DRIVE ON PEKING, SPRING OF 1928

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Fourth Plenary Session, preparations were begun for co-ordinating the Nationalist military machine preparatory to the drive on Peking. Plans were perfected for a combined advance by Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and Ho Yin-chin. Communist activities in the south were rigorously suppressed and the armies in Hunan, Hupeh, Kwantung and Kwangsi belonging to the "Kwangsi faction," which dominated at Hankow and Canton, were brought into line. At the same time plans were completed for the reorganization of the Nanking Government and appointments to the cabinet and the various ministries were rapidly filled.

At the end of March the Nationalists claimed to have approximately 500,000 troops in their combined armies. The line of attack stretched from Kalgan, to the north of Peking, south along the Chihli-Shanshi border and eastward along the borders of Shantung to the Yellow Sea. The armies under Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang headed the advance along the Peking-Hankow line and those under Chiang Kai-shek along the Tientsin-Pukow line.

The Nationalist drive on Peking was seriously under way by the middle of April.

Progress through southern Shantung was made very rapidly as the troops of Chang Tsung-chang offered little resistance. The morale of the Northern armies was reported as low as to amount to a reduction in efficiency, according to foreign military observers, of 80 per cent, and there were frequent desertions to the Nationalist ranks.

JAPAN INTERVENES IN SHANTUNG

Considerable nervousness was evident among the Japanese authorities as the Nationalists entered Shantung, and Japan's decision to intervene again was announced on April 19, when the Imperial War Office ordered some 5,000 troops to proceed to Tsingtao under the command of Lieut. General Fukuda. The order dispatching the troops stated that the purpose was "to safeguard the Japanese Nationals residing in Tsingtao and other places along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway." Official notes were dispatched the next day to both Peking and Nanking. The declaration of the Japanese Government also stated that "though the Japanese Government has absolutely refrained from supporting any party or faction in the civil wars in China, the Government will be compelled to take adequate self-defense measures in case peace and order in districts where Japanese are residing is disturbed . . . The Government has no unfriendly or hostile feeling toward China or her people, nor has it any intention whatever of interfering in the military movements of either the Northern or Southern armies. The Government hereby declares that the troops will be withdrawn immediately when the Japanese Government considers it unnecessary to retain them in China any longer."

Official protests against Japan's "intervention" in Shantung were promptly forwarded to the Japanese Foreign Office by the representatives of both Peking and Nanking.

NATIONALIST TROOPS CONFLICT WITH JAPANESE AT TSINAN

Destruction of the railway east of Tsinan by the Nationalist forces on April 28 was the first act of defiance against the Japanese. General Fukuda, on April 28, according to a Reuter dispatch, had notified

the rival Chinese military commanders that he would not interfere with the North or the South "if they used the railway properly," but at the same time he warned them not to try to cut the railway as this "would be harmful to the Japanese residents."

After several sorties the main body of the Nationalist troops entered Tsinan early on May 1. The withdrawal of Northern troops and the entry of the Nationalists was accompanied by some looting and occasional encounters in the streets, but apparently, order was maintained pretty successfully until May 3. In fact, on the afternoon of the previous day the Japanese had agreed to the request of Chiang Kai-shek to remove their defenses, and this had been partly accomplished that night. On the morning of May 3, however, serious street fighting broke out. The exact cause of the disturbances and the placing of the responsibility are impossible to determine, due to the exaggerated and conflicting reports which were sent out from both Japanese and Chinese sources. The principal outrage of the day, charged by the Chinese, was the murder of Tsai Kung-hsi, the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Shantung, and the burning of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs building. The official Japanese account states that their soldiers were fired upon by Chinese "who were lurking inside the Commissioner's Office" and that their soldiers "could not but respond to the fire and overpower them. Whether these included Mr. Tsai is not known. It need scarcely be stated, however, that the Japanese troops would never . . . kill a single non-resisting Chinese citizen. Still less need it be said that the allegation regarding the 'cutting off of nose and ears' is simply impossible, from the very nature of the character and habits of the Japanese people."

JAPAN PRESENTS AN ULTIMATUM

An attempt to mediate on the part of the American and British Consuls resulted in an agreement on May 4 that the Chinese forces should withdraw six miles from Tsinan. A certain number of Chinese troops were left in the city, ostensibly in

order to protect foreign consulates located outside of the Japanese area. Occasional firing was reported on May 5, but during May 6 and 7, the city was reported relatively quiet. By May 7, only five or six thousand Chinese troops were reported still in Tsinan. The Japanese at this time had about 3,000 soldiers in Tsinan, and approximately the same number at Tsingtao and scattered along the railway in small detachments. On May 7, at 4:00 P. M., the Japanese Commander sent a twelve-hour ultimatum to the Chinese demanding drastic punishment for the Chinese commander guilty of atrocities, complete disarmament of the troops engaged in the anti-Japanese outbreak; immediate cession of warlike acts against the Japanese, and withdrawal of Nationalist troops to seven miles on each side of the railway.

Shortly before midnight on May 7, the Chinese commander sent a representative to the Japanese asking that time be given to receive instructions from Chiang Kai-shek, who was at Tainan, as to the response to be made to the Japanese demands. They state that insufficient time was given for orders to be sent out to the Nationalist troops to leave the proscribed area. At 3:55 A. M. the next morning, according to their own reports, the Japanese started forcibly expelling the Chinese troops from the seven-mile zone. The Chinese offered resistance and fighting followed. Bombardment of specified areas in the city by the Japanese continued until the afternoon, when the most severe fighting with the Chinese ceased.

Official Japanese statements list their casualties at twenty-one soldiers and fourteen civilians killed, and seventy-nine soldiers and fifteen civilians wounded. Chinese sources report that their casualties were many times greater than the Japanese. Accounts have varied from several hundred to well over a thousand, the number of civilians reported killed being very large.

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DEMANDS APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS

On May 15, the Japanese Cabinet instructed the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Shantung to make the following demands on the Nationalist Government for reparation in connection with the Tsinan outrages.

These included: (1) A formal apology from Chiang Kai-shek; (2) Punishment of General Ho Yao-tsu and others responsible for the outrages; (3) Suspension of hostilities, propaganda and warlike activities within seven miles from Tsinan, Tsingtao and the railway. The next day Chiang Kai-shek was reported to have stated that he would be compelled to accept the Japanese demands in order not to hamper the advance against the North, and on May 21, the Nanking Foreign Affairs Committee agreed unanimously "that an early and mutually satisfactory settlement of the Tsinan affair is advisable."

In the meantime Japanese reinforcements of 25,000 men had arrived in Shantung, and throughout China popular feeling ran high against Japan. Many Japanese nationals, especially in south China, were forced to evacuate to warships sent for their protection. A boycott of steadily increasing proportions was developing at the time that this report went to press.

While the Nationalist armies under Chiang Kai-shek were in conflict with the Japanese at Tsinan, the Shansi and Kuominchun forces under Governor Yen and the "Christian General," Feng, made steady progress toward Peking. A large part of the Southern Army was disarmed by the Japanese at Tsinan, but the main body was allowed to use the railway to proceed northward after the acceptance of the Japanese demands. Tsinan was turned over to the joint administration of the Japanese authorities and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, working in conjunction with the local Chinese police.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING JAPAN'S INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

As the Nationalist armies converged on Peking, the Japanese addressed a Memorandum to Peking and Nanking, on May 18, on Japanese policy in Manchuria. The Memorandum warned that Japan might be constrained to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and that should the Southerners pursue the Northerners it would disarm the troops of both sides before they would be allowed to enter Manchuria.

The Nationalist Government replied on

May 29, stating that it would take "proper and satisfactory measures" to protect foreigners in Manchuria. It regarded the measures which Japan might be constrained to adopt in Manchuria, not only as "interference in China's domestic affairs, but also as a flagrant violation of the principle of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, a principle well established in international law." Such measures the Nationalist Government declared it could never recognize.

Chang Tso-lin's attitude to this Memorandum remained for a time uncertain. On May 9, he was reported to have sent a circular telegram to all the civil and military authorities throughout China calling for a cessation of hostilities, and stating that his policy had been actuated principally by a desire to suppress Bolshevism, and that he greatly regretted that foreigners should have been involved in China's domestic struggles. He had accordingly ordered his "victorious troops" at Changteh and along the Shansi railway to cease hostilities. The commanders in these areas had apparently learned his desires and begun to withdraw.

CHANG TSO-LIN SURRENDERS PEKING TO THE NATIONALISTS

Chang's statement was preliminary to his dramatic farewell gesture in Peking. During the afternoon of June 1, he received the representatives of the foreign Powers at the Presidential Palace and delivered his valedictory, reciting what he had done to preserve peace and order and promising that

he would continue these pacific efforts regardless of his personal whereabouts. That night he departed for Manchuria. Announcement was made the next day that a Committee of Safety would govern Peking during the interim between the evacuation of the Mukden troops and the entry of the Nationalists. Chang's train was bombed near Mukden, and on June 21, his death was announced.

Although the surrender of Peking to the Nationalists terminates the most dramatic phase of China's civil war, and places the Nationalists in virtual control of all China, the problems of unification now facing them appear to be only beginning. Some observers are of the opinion that this "Kuomintangization" of China will end the dissension in the Party and lead them on to a period of reconstruction. Others are skeptical. It is uncertain at best whether Chiang Kai-shek will continue to play a part in the Nationalist Party and Government, whether he will have to surrender to Feng Yu-hsiang, or whether control will disintegrate into regional satrapies. This latter development would mean a return to the conditions prevailing in North China prior to the emergence of the Kuomintang as a factor in Chinese politics.

The problem of the future would seem to hinge upon the willingness or otherwise of the militarists to subordinate themselves to the civil element in the next phase of China's history.

ANNEX I

WHO'S WHO IN CHINA

(As of June 1, 1928)

NATIONALIST AND ALLIED ARMIES

Chiang Kai-shek (Jeong Kai Shek)

Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army of South China from June, 1926, to August, 1927. Re-appointed February, 1928. Offered resignation June, 1928. (Present status uncertain.)

Feng Yu-hsiang (Fung Yoo Sheong)

Commander of the Kuominchun (National People's Army); allied with Wu Pei-fu until October, 1924, when he took over Peking and ousted Wu. In Russia during most of 1926. Entered into alliance with Nationalists in December, 1926.

Yen Hsi-shan (Yen She Shahn)

Governor of Shansi Province since Revolution of 1911; known as the "Model Governor" because of his excellent administration. Member of Northern (Ankuochun) Alliance from December, 1926 until June, 1927, when he joined with the Nationalists.

NORTHERN (ANKUOCHUN) AND ALLIED ARMIES

Chang Tso-lin (Johng Zo Lin)

Frequently known as the "Manchurian War Lord"; Generalissimo in command of the Northern (Ankuochun) Alliance; self-appointed "Dictator" of North China, June 1,

1927; dominated the Peking Government from June, 1926, until the taking of Peking in June, 1928, by the Nationalists. (Reported killed June 5, 1928.)

Chang Hsueh-liang (Johng Shware Leong)

Son of Marshal Chang Tso-lin; General in the Manchurian Army. (Reported as succeeding to father's position as Dictator of Manchuria.)

Yang Yu-ting (Yawng You Ding)

Chief-of-Staff to Chang Tso-lin; Commander-in-chief of Fengtien Forces. (Reported killed June 17.)

Chang Tsung-chang (Johng Zoong Johng)

Shantung General; notorious as the worst of the "brigand generals"; member of Northern (Ankuochun) Alliance. Rose from coolie status. (Present whereabouts uncertain.)

Sun Ch'uang-fang (Soon Chewong Fong)

Made Military Governor of Kiangsu (Shanghai area) in 1925; 1926, became overlord of five provinces and concurrently Director-General of Shanghai and Woosung Port Administration. 1927, driven out of Kiangsu by Nationalists. Member of the Northern Military Alliance. (Whereabouts at present uncertain.)

NANKING CABINET

(Appointed February, 1928)

Huang Fu (Hwong Foo)

Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Recently offered resignation, not yet reported accepted.) 1921, adviser Chinese Delegation, Washington Conference. Served in several Peking governments at various times as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education, Acting Premier. 1925, delegate to Customs Conference. July-Aug., 1927, Mayor of Greater Shanghai.

Soong, T. V.

Minister of Finance. Brother of Madame Sun Yat-sen; 1917-1924, in banking business. 1925-27, Minister of Finance, Canton Government; member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

Wang Poh-chun (Wong Po Joon)

Minister of Communications.

Hsueh Tu-pi (Shware Doo Bee)

Minister of the Interior. 1922, Commissioner of Finance in Shensi and Honan; 1923-24, Vice-Minister of Justice; Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and director, Peking Octroi. 1924-26, officiating Minister of Justice; director, Peking Octroi; Mayor of Peking, Civil Governor of Kansu. Adviser to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang since 1926.

Yi Pei-chi (Yee Bay Chee)

Minister of Agriculture and Mining. 1926, Minister of Education; concurrently President, Girls' Normal School, Peking; August, 1927, President, Labour University, Shanghai.

Kung, H. H. (Koong)

Minister of Commerce and Industry. Since 1907 founder and principal, Shansi Oberlin Memorial College. Adviser to Governor Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi; 1922, adviser Shantung Rehabilitation Commission; 1924-25, Assistant Director-General of Sino-Russian negotiations. 1926-27, Commissioner of Industry and Acting Minister of Finance, Canton Government.

Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei (Chai Yooan Pay)

Chancellor, National University Council. 1912, Minister of Education, Nanking Provisional Government and in first Republican Cabinet, Peking. 1917-23, Chancellor, Peking National University. Resigned as protest against Cabinet's interference with the judiciary. 1923-26, travelled abroad, Europe and America. 1927, Minister of Education, Nanking National Government. Author of many volumes on Chinese ethics, philosophy and literature. Translator of several German treatises.

Wang Ch'ung-hui (Wong Choong Hway)

Minister of Justice. 1907, barrister-at-law, London; assistant to delegate to 2nd Hague Peace Conference. 1912, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanking Provisional Government; Minister of Justice, first Republican Cabinet. 1913-16, editor, Chung Hua Book Publishing Company; Vice-President, Fuhtan University, Shanghai. 1917-1927, Chairman, Law Codification Commission, Peking. 1920, Chief Justice, Supreme Court. 1921, delegate, League of Nations Assembly and Washington Conference; elected deputy judge, Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague. 1922 and again in 1924, Premier, Peking. 1925, Delegate, Customs Conference; 1926, International Commission of Extraterritoriality and Chairman, Commission for Investigation of Extraterritoriality; 1926, Minister of Education; 1927, Minister of Justice, Nanking Nationalist Government.

T'an Yen K'ai (Tahn Yen Kai)

Chairman of Nanking Government Council. 1910, Chairman of Hunan Provincial Assembly; chief of Hunan military department, 1911 Revolution; 1912, Military Governor of Hunan; 1915, took part in Hunan revolt against Yuan Shih-k'ai. 1916 and again in 1918, reappointed Military Governor of Hunan; 1923, Chief Secretary of Canton Government; 1925, elected member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. 1926, Commander of Northern Expedition Second Army Corps; 1927, member of Nationalist Government at Hankow and then Nanking.

OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES

Wu, Dr. C. C.

Nanking Nationalist Delegate now in Washington. 1913, Member Peking Parliament and Constitution Drafting Committee; 1915, councillor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Cabinet; 1917, joined the Canton Government; 1919, Canton Delegate, Paris Peace Conference; 1920-24, Vice and then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canton; 1925, member of Military Council and Mayor of Canton; disagreed with Chiang Kai-shek and left Canton. May, 1927, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanking Nationalist Government. Resigned, December, 1927.

Sun Fo (Soon Faw)

Nanking Nationalist delegate, now in Europe. Son of Sun Yat-sen. 1921-22, Mayor of Canton. 1923-24, reappointed, Mayor of Canton; member of Political Department of Canton Government; 1926, Commissioner of Kwangtung Provincial Bureau of Reconstruction. 1927, Minister of Communications, Nationalist Government of Hankow and Nanking.

Hu Han-min (Hoo Hahn Min)

Nanking Nationalist delegate, now in Europe. Took active part in organizing early revolutionary program. Closely associated with Dr. Sun in Nanking Provisional Government and later in Canton Government. December, 1925, went to Moscow as Canton delegate to investigate agrarian problems and the Soviet system. May-August, 1927, member of Nanking Government and Chairman of the Kuomintang Political Council.

Chen, Eugene (Chun)

Born in Trinidad, West Indies. 1912, went to China. For a time legal adviser in Peking Government. Rapidly became known as fearless writer and critic of Northern Government. 1917, joined Canton group under Sun Yat-sen. 1922-24, adviser to Canton Government; 1924, member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. 1925, returned to Peking with Sun Yat-sen, kidnapped and narrowly escaped being shot by Mukden soldiers. 1926, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canton; 1927, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hankow Government. Left for Moscow, August, 1927.

Wang Ching-wei (Wong Jing Way)

Member of early Tung Meng Hui and one of the most ardent early revolutionists; 1906, toured South Sea Islands with Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionary leaders. 1909, unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the Prince Regent. Took active part in first Nanking Government and later Canton Government. 1924, member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and chief adviser to Sun Yat-sen. 1925-26, forced out of Canton by Chiang Kai-shek. April, 1927, invited to return and joined the Hankow Government. September, 1927, announced retirement from Kuomintang councils. October, 1927, tried to set up a Nationalist-Communist government at Canton. Left China early in 1928.

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